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Abstract: This paper analyses the activity of national parliaments in EU affairs in the form of 
resolutions. Covering the time period from the late 1990s until the present, the paper examines 
parliamentary motions and resolutions on EU affairs in six West European countries: Austria, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom. Differences in the frequency of resolutions 
between countries as well as between party groups with regard to motions are examined. Moreover, 
all motions and resolutions were hand coded to establish the valence of the texts, i.e. the extent to 
which they are supportive or critical of the government. Formal scrutiny powers in EU affairs do not 
seem to have an impact on the frequency with which resolutions are issued. The activity of national 
parliaments in the form of resolutions is mostly driven by ‘issue entrepreneurs’, parties which are 
critical of the European Union and which see it as a salient issue. Motions initiated by issue 
entrepreneurs are very critical of the government’s policy and of the European Union. Moreover, 
Motions by issue entrepreneurs tend to have a longer preamble and a shorter operational part 
compared to motions by mainstream opposition and government parties. The reason for this is most 
likely that issue entrepreneurs use motions to express their opinion on the EU in general instead of 
formulating a targeted criticism of the government’s policy. The parliamentary activity brought about 
by issue entrepreneurs might thus not lead to an increase in actual democratic control and 
accountability in EU affairs.  
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
 This paper analyses the determinants of activity of national parliaments in EU affairs 
in the form of resolutions. Resolutions can be seen as the most important expression of the 
government-related scrutiny function of national parliaments in EU affairs. Analysing the 
factors driving parliamentary activity in the form of resolutions on EU affairs is thus an 
important step in the evaluation of the overall activity and effectiveness of national 
parliamentary scrutiny in the European Union. Besides a quantitative analysis of the 
frequency of resolutions, the valence of the resolutions was evaluated. Thus, the paper tries to 
find out whether the resolutions are critical or supportive of the government’s position. For 
this purpose, resolutions for six countries (Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain and the 
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United Kingdom) covering the time period from the late 1990s until the present were hand 
coded and then analysed quantitatively.  
The findings of this paper show that issue entrepreneurs (Eurosceptic parties for 
which Europe is salient) are a driving force with regard to the activity of national parliaments 
in the form of resolutions. When issue entrepreneurs are strongly represented, more 
resolutions are issued by parliament especially if the public is Eurosceptic. Moreover, 
resolutions tend to be more critical in this context. The formal powers of parliaments only 
have a limited impact on the activity in the form of resolutions: They influence the valence of 
resolutions, but not their quantity. Moreover, this paper shows that resolutions initiated by 
issue entrepreneurs generally have longer preambles and shorter operational parts – arguably 
a sign that these parties pay more attention to general political points instead of technical 
scrutiny. This might indicate that a trade-off exists between activity, assertiveness and 
effectiveness with regard to the government control function of parliament in EU affairs. 
 The next section provides a definition of resolutions in parliamentary scrutiny of EU 
affairs and explains how resolutions are issued in the different scrutiny systems. The third 
section describes the chosen method and case selection. The fourth section presents the 
theoretical framework and the hypotheses tested in this paper. In the fifth section, the data 
and statistical models employed are described, while the seventh section contains the 
analysis. The final section discusses the results of the analysis and its implication.  
 
 
2. Defining Resolutions 
 
 In contrast to other parliamentary activities such as parliamentary questions or plenary 
debates, defining what constitutes a ‘resolution’ is not straightforward. There is considerable 
variation regarding this form of activity between parliaments with different parliamentary 
traditions and different scrutiny systems for European affairs. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
a resolution as ‘The determination or decision, in regard to its opinion or intention, of a 
deliberative or legislative body (…)’ (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2014). Therefore, on the most 
basic level, a resolution is the formal expression of the opinion of parliament on a particular 
matter. For the present purpose, proposals for resolutions suggested by particular party 
groups will also be counted as resolutions, even though they might not finally be agreed on 
by the committee or parliament as a whole: ‘[A resolutions is] [a]lso a motion or formal 
proposition offered for adoption by such a body’ (ibid.). Resolutions can be binding or non-
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binding in character (ibid). Generally, resolutions are thus defined for the present purpose as 
relatively short written statement in which parliament, a committee or a party group expresses 
its opinion on an EU legal act (which may be both primary and secondary law, binding and 
non-binding) and/or the government’s treatment thereof as well as suggestions for future 
treatment of the legal act.   
 The exact form a resolution takes (in terms of its length, level of detail, technicality, 
structure and the extent to which they are binding) differs significant between parliaments. 
The extent to which they can be compared is therefore admittedly limited. However, despite 
these differences, resolutions in EU affairs are arguably functionally equivalent in the six 
cases analysed in this paper. They are the most direct and formal way in which parliament or 
a party group (or even a group of MPs) can express their opinion on an EU legal act and/or 
the government’s treatment of and position on the latter. This form of activity can be 
contrasted with the less formal avenue of expression in parliamentary debates, which is 
arguably first and foremost addressed to the citizens (Raunio, 2011, 306). Resolutions are 
therefore the form of activity which is most clearly an expression of the ‘government control’ 
(p. 307) or actual ‘scrutiny’ function of parliament in EU affairs. By contrast, parliamentary 
debates are the most important venue for parliaments to fulfil their communication function 
in EU affairs (p. 306). Resolutions are thus especially well-suited to analyse the extent of 
activity of national parliaments in EU affairs with regard to the scrutiny function as well as 
the extent to which parliaments generally support the government or are critical of its actions.  
 Resolutions on EU affairs can fulfil different functions and take on different formats 
depending on the formal scrutiny system of a parliament. In EU affairs, a basic distinction 
has been made between so-called document-based and procedural models of national 
parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs (COSAC, 2007). In practice, most parliaments employ a 
mix of both approaches to scrutiny (ibid.). In document based systems, the appropriate 
committee(s) examine legislative proposals from European institutions and report their 
opinion to the chamber as a whole and to the government (COSAC, 2007, p. 8). Many of 
these systems have a ‘scrutiny reserve’, which means that the government cannot vote in the 
Council unless the parliament has agreed beforehand (ibid.). The extent to which the opinions 
of parliament are binding for the government varies (ibid.). The UK, France Germany, 
Ireland and Spain are examples of these document-based systems (ibid.)  
 In procedural systems, the European Affairs Committee can in principle give a 
binding mandate to the government for negotiations in the Council (p. 9). Of the countries 
analysed here, only Austria falls, in theory, in this category (p. 14). Other examples include 
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famously the Danish Folketing and the Finish Parliament (ibid.). However, arguably the 
distinction between these two categories is not crucial for the present purpose. Resolutions 
that vary in the extent to which they bind the government are issued in both types of systems. 
The quantity of resolutions as well as the extent to which they are critical of the government 
is also equally important in both types of systems. In both document based and mandating 
systems, only critical resolutions can induce the government to change its position.  
 A further distinction has to be made between centralized and decentralized scrutiny 
systems. In some countries, parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs is concentrated in a 
European Affairs Committee (Austria, France, Spain and the United Kingdom in the present 
study). In other countries (Germany and Ireland among the countries studied here) the 
sectoral committees in which a proposal falls are responsible for scrutiny, with the European 
Affairs Committee focusing on ‘horizontal’ and institutional questions. Indeed, an increasing 
number of countries seem to follow this approach, a phenomenon some authors have termed 
the ‘mainstreaming’ of EU affairs (Gatterman et al., 2013, p. 5). Arguably, this is the 
consequence of the increased breath of competences and complexity of the EU and changes 
introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon (p. 10). There are thus some parliaments in which EU 
matters and centralized in the EAC, whereas in others they are decentralized in sectoral 
committees (Raunio and Wiberg, 2010, p. 79).  
 These institutional differences make comparisons between parliaments with different 
systems difficult. Thus, while in centralized systems only the activities of the EAC have to be 
collected, in decentralized systems also the EU-related activities of other committees have to 
be analysed. A potential difficulty would be to distinguish between the EU related and non-
EU-related activities of these committees (Raunio and Wiberg, 2010, p. 87). However, the 
search functions and committee websites of the parliaments analysed here allow collecting 
the EU-related resolutions of the sectoral committees. The different instruments classified as 
resolutions are summarized in Appendix 1.  
 Another form of parliamentary activity which has been introduced with the Lisbon 
Treaty is the so-called early warning system of subsidiarity control (EWS).  The opinions and 
reasoned opinions offered by parliaments will not be analysed in this chapter. The reason for 
this is twofold. The EWS and the political dialogue relate to national parliaments’ control of 
the Commission, and not of their national governments. Thus this form of activity is not 
relevant in explaining difference between the formal powers in the national context and 
actual activity. Moreover, influencing the government is arguably a much more powerful tool 
than the EWS (Corbett, 2014). The EWS is only concerned with the question of whether the 
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matters falls into the realm of EU competencies and does not aim to substantively influence 
the proposal (ibid.). Moreover, the procedure is used very rarely, as mentioned above, even 
though some parliaments are very active in issuing reasoned opinions. However, there are 
strong differences between parliaments (Gattermann and Hefftler, 2013). This leads to the 
second reason why the EWS and the political dialogue are not covered here: they relate to the 
collective role of national parliaments, and not to their individual influence (Cooper, 2013, p. 
532; Sprungk, 2013, p. 552; Raunio, 2011, p. 307). This form of activity does not thus relate 
directly to either the government-control or citizen-related function but rather to a 
‘networking function’ of national parliaments in EU affairs (Leifeld and Malang, 2014, p. 3), 
and is therefore not relevant for the question of how (domestic) formal powers and actual 
activity relate to each other. 
 
 
3. Method and Case Selection 
 
 Three properties of parliamentary resolutions in EU affairs are analysed in this paper. 
As a first step, the quantity of resolutions is examined i.e. the number of resolutions 
according to the above definition in a given month. This number allows comparisons of the 
overall activity of the parliament in EU affairs in the form of resolutions, changes over time 
and differences between different party groups (especially between issue entrepreneurs and 
mainstream parties) in issuing resolutions. As a second step, the content or ‘quality’ of 
resolutions is analysed. More specifically, the extent to which the resolutions are critical or 
supportive of the government is investigated. A critical resolution by the opposition or even a 
government party can be more appropriately considered as ‘real’ scrutiny or government 
control, whereas resolutions which just support or endorse the position of the government 
might not justifiably qualify as such. The analysis of the valence of the resolutions can thus 
give a valuable assessment of the extent to which the result of the ‘quantitative’ assessment 
of sheer activity are a realistic indicator of parliament fulfilling its role with regard to the 
scrutiny function in EU affairs.  
 Since the resolutions are generally short (often around 250 words) and use a rather 
formal language, using automated procedures such as Wordscores or Wordstat might be 
difficult (Klemmensen et al., 2007, p. 750). Moreover, the relevant dimension (support or 
criticism) might not be clear enough to use automated methods (Proksch and Slapin, 2014, p. 
132). The application of automated methods to parliamentary oversights is thus rather 
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difficult (Proksch and Slapin, 2014, p. 134). The use of a traditional sentiment analysis 
dictionary might equally be questionable for linguistic reasons – comparable content 
sentiment dictionaries for all languages covered in this project are not available.  
 For these reasons and given the relatively small number of resolutions issued by each 
parliament per year and month, hand coding of debates is the preferred option. To cross-
validate the results, ten per cent of the resolutions will be coded by a second coder and 
Krippendorff’s Alpha, an index of inter-coder reliability, will be calculated (Krippendorff, 
2004, p. 221). Moreover, the length of the resolution/motion, the length of the operational 
part (in which the actual mandate for the government in included), the length of the 
preamble/explanation (in which the reasons for the mandate are elaborated on) as well as the 
proportional share of these two parts of the documents could be included. Following Huber 
and Shipan, the length of a document is used here as a proxy for how detailed the mandate for 
the government is (2002: 73). Moreover, motions initiated by issue entrepreneurs tend to 
have longer preambles and shorter operational parts since they do not focus on technical 
scrutiny but rather on simple messages which are related to general points on European 
integration. Comparing the ratio of the preamble to the operational part of the resolutions thus 
allows to assess the extent to which the resolutions by the different party groups are detailed 
and can thus be considered ‘effective’ or ‘serious’ scrutiny (Huber and Shipan, 2002: 178).  
 The following countries were chosen as country cases for both the analysis: Austria, 
Germany, France, Spain, Ireland and the UK. The ten ‘new’ member states which joined the 
EU in 2004 and 2007 were excluded because of the historical perspective of the study. Given 
the timeframe of the study from 1992 to present, the short length of membership of the new 
member states would make a meaningful comparison across time impossible. Moreover, the 
countries were chosen because they represent an excellent institutional spread and the highest 
possible variation regarding the independent variables of the study. The aim was thus to 
select a diverse set of cases (Gerring, 2000, p. 97). Thus, the analysis includes countries with 
a very Eurosceptic electorate, such as Austria and the UK, as well as countries with generally 
more pro-European voters such as Ireland. Moreover, countries with strong formal scrutiny 
powers, such as Austria, and those with rather weak formal scrutiny powers, such as Ireland, 
are included. There is also strong variation regarding the average dissent within parties on 
European integration, with Austria and Germany showing very low values and the UK with 
very high values. The same holds true for the presence of Euroscepticism in the party system 
and the salience of the EU, as expressed by the issue entrepreneurship score. 
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4. Theory and Hypotheses  
 
 The present paper draws on the Principal-Agent Approach (PA), which was originally 
applied to the US Congress (Mayhew, 1974, Ferejohn, 1986, Fiorina, 1979, McCubbins, Noll 
and Weingast, 1987). The major problem identified in the relationship between principal and 
agent is that there are almost always conflicting interests between the two, so that agency loss 
can occur – the agent does not fulfil what the principal wants him to do (Kiwiet and 
McCubbins, 1991, p. 5). The potential for agency loss is larger in EU affairs than in domestic 
politics, since the government has informational advantages vis-à-vis parliament. The 
government is involved in Council negotiations and is thus better informed on the position of 
other member states. To make matters worse, the parliament cannot control what its own 
government is actually doing in the Council (Moravcsik, 1994). The parliament thus has to 
actively use all the oversight mechanisms at its disposal to alleviate the informational 
asymmetry.  
 Among the first to apply PA systematically to parliamentary democracy were Strøm, 
Bergman and Müller in an edited volume (Strøm, Bergman and Müller, 2003). They point out 
that parliamentary democracy, in its simplest form, represents one continuous chain of 
delegation (ibid.). The ultimate principal in this chain is the electorate. On Election Day, 
voters delegate to legislators, who are thus the agents of the voters (Strøm, 2003, p. 63).  At 
the same time, legislators act as principals of the chief executive and the cabinet, whom they 
in turn elect (ibid.). The cabinet ministers are thus the agents of the legislators. In the 
opposite direction to this chain of delegation runs a line of accountability (Auel, 2007, p. 
496).  
 The preferences of the ultimate principal, the citizens, are logically the first step in the 
chain of delegation and determine what positions the actors in the chain of delegation have to 
comply with. The underlying rationale is that parliaments in countries with a Eurosceptic 
electorate might be more inclined to be active in scrutinising the government. Eurosceptic 
principals expect their agents to be more assertive on EU affairs. In contrast, where there is a 
permissive consensus in favour of the EU, MPs might have fewer incentives to invest their 
time and resources in scrutiny (Bergman, 1997). Arguably, this might also hold true for the 
number of resolutions issued per month. Moreover, it can be hypothesized the resolutions 
tend to be more critical if the public is Eurosceptic. 
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 H1a: Parliaments issue more resolutions on EU affairs per month if the public is 
 Eurosceptic. 
 
 H1b: Parliaments issue more critical resolutions on EU affairs if the public is 
 Eurosceptic. 
 
 In general, in European democracies, the impact of political parties has to be taken 
into account (King, 1976). MPs of Eurosceptic parties have a strong interest in being 
perceived as active on Europe (De Vries and Edwards, 2009, in Auel and Raunio, 2014b, p. 
16). We can thus expect scrutiny activity to be high if Europe is salient for the parties in the 
party system and if they are sceptical about it – in other words, if issue entrepreneurs are 
present. Issue entrepreneurship is defined as ‘a political strategy with which parties mobilize 
new policy issues that have been largely ignored by the political mainstream and adopt a 
position on the issue that is substantially different from the current position of the 
mainstream’ (Hobolt and De Vries, 2012, p. 3). Usually these are ‘challenger parties’, i.e. 
parties which have not held political office before (ibid.). However, in the present context all 
parties which display a combination of perceiving the EU as highly salient and negative can 
be considered issue entrepreneurs. Parties which adopt such a strategy have a lot of electoral 
benefit from being perceived as active in EU affairs but face very little cost. We can thus 
assume that if issue entrepreneurs feature strongly in the party system, more Euroscepticism 
would lead to more resolutions on EU affairs. For them, there would be higher benefits from 
scrutiny activity relative to costs. If parties do not care deeply about Europe or are generally 
accommodating of it, but are faced with a Eurosceptic electorate, MPs might want to be 
perceived as active in EU affairs by issuing resolutions. They face potentially high costs by 
investing time and resources in an issue on which they diverge from their voters. On the party 
level, it is thus hypothesized that parties which are issue entrepreneurs initiate more 
motions/resolutions on Europe. Given their negative position on the EU, there resolutions are 
also likely to be very critical. 
 
 H2a: Parliaments with a high collective issue entrepreneurship score issue more 
 resolutions in a given month. 
 
 H2b: Parties which are issue entrepreneurs issue more resolutions on Europe in a 
 given month. 
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 When MPs as agents of the voters and principals of the government have diverging 
preferences, intra-party dissent is the result of a conflict between the interests of the MPs 
principals, voters and the party leadership, according to Competing Principals Theory (CPT) 
(Carey, 2007, Sieberer, 2013). It is in the interest of parties, or more precisely, the party 
leadership, to present a coherent position to the electorate (Auel and Raunio, 2014b, p. 16). 
MPs can be expected to manage their function as principals and agents of the government in 
EU affairs in such a way that their interests in the different functions are not put at risk (Auel, 
2007, p. 10). Thus, party cohesion, which is in general a very important factor in comparative 
politics, also seems to play an important role in how much parliaments scrutinise their 
governments in EU affairs (Auel and Benz, 2005, p. 383). Under certain conditions, defecting 
from the party whip can be beneficial for both the party and individual MPs, since it enables 
the party to appeal to a wide array of voters (Kam, 2009, p. 131). However, in general, being 
perceived as divided on an issue clearly harms a party’s prospects in the next elections (Kam, 
2009, p. 134). This logic might be especially pronounced in the case of European affairs, 
when voters are Eurosceptic and perceive EU affairs as an important issue. Thus, if parties 
are divided on a significant issue such as European integration, they are likely not to issue 
resolutions on the issue (Auel, 2007, p. 492). This holds true for both government and 
opposition parties. Parties thus channel how MPs react to the position of the electorate in EU 
affairs. In the present framework, parties or party cohesion are thus seen as an additional 
factor MPs have to take into account in their costs-benefit calculation of whether to become 
active in EU affairs. Parties, or more precisely their leadership, are the second principal of 
MPs, after voters (Auel, 2009, p. 22). We can thus speak of a situation of ‘multiple 
principals’ (Lyne, Nielsen and Tierney, 2003, p. 7). 
 If parties are divided over Europe, the MPs are likely to be more reluctant to be active 
scrutinisers. Parties might want to prevent these divisions to become apparent, since their 
position on the EU has a significant effect on the propensity of voters to vote for them, as De 
Vries and Tillman have shown (2011, p. 10). There is thus ‘issue voting’ with regard to the 
EU (see Downs, 1957). Whether to be active in scrutiny then becomes a question of when the 
rewards of being perceived as active outweigh the costs of presenting an incoherent party 
image. At the party level, it is thus suspected that parties which are internally divided issue 
fewer resolutions on Europe per month.   
 
 
March 2015   J.M. Hoerner  
 
10 
 
 H3a: If parties are collectively divided on Europe, their parliaments issue fewer 
 resolutions on EU affairs 
 
 H3b: Parties which are internally divided issue fewer resolutions on Europe in a 
 given month.  
 
 Finally, with regard to the content of resolutions, it can be argued that issue 
entrepreneurs will focus more on general criticism of the European Union instead of actual 
scrutiny in the form of detailed policy suggestions. This measure was inspired by the work of 
Huber and Shipan who use the relative length of legal documents as a proxy for the level of 
discretion a bureaucratic agent has in the implementation of the laws (Huber and Shipan, 
2002, p. 73). As a proxy for the relationship between general statements and actual policy 
prescriptions, the ratio between the preamble and the operational part of resolutions is 
employed, as explained above.  
 
 H 4 Resolutions initiated by Issue entrepreneurs will have a lower ratio of the 
 operational part to the preamble. 
 
 The literature on national parliaments has recognized that formal scrutiny powers do 
not necessarily mirror their actual activity in EU affairs (Auel and Benz, 2005; Pollack and 
Smolinski, 2003; Sprungk, 2007). Formal scrutiny powers mostly concern the extent to which 
parliament receives information on EU affairs and the extent to which it can issue binding 
mandates to the government (Winzen, 2012, p.660). A. The role of formal rights will thus be 
included as a control variable in the analysis. Moreover, the extent to which Europe is topical 
in a particular country at a given point in time might have an impact on the extent to which 
motions and resolutions on Europe are issued. This might for example be the case when a 
country currently holds the Council Presidency, which is included as a control variable. 
Finally, the average left/right position of the parliament as a whole and of particular parties is 
included as control variables, as well as the government/opposition status of individual 
parties. 
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5. Data and Model  
 
 All in all, 4062 resolutions were collected covering the time period from the mid-
1990s until the present, even though for France, Ireland and the United Kingdom data for the 
entire time period are not available or could not be coded for reasons of feasibility (see 
Appendix 1). For the analysis at the parliamentary level, the resolutions are aggregated by 
month. Given the distribution of the number of resolutions which follows a poisson 
distribution, a multilevel-count model was applied to assess the overall number of resolutions 
by month (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, p. 696) (Model 1). In order to analyse the 
overall valence of the resolutions issued by a parliament in a given month, all resolutions 
were hand coded for their valence on a Likert-type scale from -2 to 2. The mean of the 
valence scores for all resolutions issued was used as the dependent variable for a multilevel 
linear regression (Model 2). To account for autocorrelation, a lagged dependent variable was 
included (Becks and Katz, 1995). 
 As predictor variables, the issue entrepreneur score of the parliament was included, 
operationalized as the difference between the mean party position on Europe of all parties in 
parliament and the party position of each respective party, multiplied by the salience score of 
each party (Hobolt and De Vries, 2012, p. 256). For the analysis at the parliamentary level, 
the sum of the issue entrepreneur scores all parties represented in parliament in a given month 
was calculated. Popular Euroscepticism is operationalized as the number or respondents 
stating that membership of their country to the European Union were a ‘good thing’ minus 
those stating that it was ‘a bad thing’ in the Eurobarometer survey pre-2011 (Eurobaromter, 
2015). As control variables, the mean left/right position for all parties in parliament and the 
mean internal party dissent were included, all based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES, 2014). Moreover, the strength of formal scrutiny powers based on Winzen (2012) 
and whether a country held the Council presidency in a given month were included. Data on 
the composition of parliament were derived from the ParlGov databased (Parlgov, 2015). 
Missing values were filled in using linear interpolation. 
 For the analysis at the party level, the number of resolutions per party and month was 
aggregated (Model 3). As for the analysis of resolutions at the country level, a multilevel 
poisson regression was employed for the analysis of the number of resolutions. For the 
analysis of the valence of the resolutions, the monthly mean was calculated and a multilevel 
linear regression was applied (Model 4). The individual issue entrepreneur scores were 
calculated following Hobolt and De Vries (2012, p. 256). As in the country level analysis, the 
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left/right position and internal dissent were included as control variables. Information on the 
government/opposition status of a party was retrieved from the ParlGov Database. The model 
also includes random intercepts for the different countries and party groups. A lagged 
dependent variable was included to deal with autocorrelation. For the analysis at the party 
level, Ireland and the UK were excluded since resolutions are issued by the committee as a 
whole.  
In model 5, the ratio of the length of the preamble of a resolution and its operational part 
is specified as the dependent variable for a multilevel linear regression. In this model, the 
individual resolutions serve as observations. A lagged dependent variable and random 
intercepts for countries and parties were applied. The same predictor variables as in models 3 
and 4 are included. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1 below:  
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Table 1: Results of the statistical analysis. Models 1 and 3: Multilevel poisson regression. Models 2, 4 and 5: Multilevel linear regression. Random intercepts at the country 
and party level respectively. Country dummies and lagged dependent variable are omitted. Standard errors in parentheses. ***=significant at the .01 level, **=significant at 
the .05 level, *=significant at the .1 level.
Model/ Dependent 
Variable 
Model 1 
(Number of 
Resolutions by 
Parliament/Mo
nth) 
Model 2 
(Valence of 
Resolutions by 
Parliament/Month) 
Model 3 
(Number of 
Resolutions by 
Party/Month) 
Model 4 
(Valence of 
Resolutions by 
Party/Month) 
Model 5 
(Ratio 
Preamble/Operational 
Part by Resolution) 
 
Issue Entrepreneur 
(Parliament) 
 
.20 (.05)*** 
 
-.12(.05) ** 
   
 
Mean Dissent .02 (.05)  .18 (.08) **    
Mean L/R .05 (.11) -.34 (.08) ***    
Issue Entrepreneur 
(party) 
  .03 (.00) *** -.04 (.01) ** -.07 (.03) ** 
Party Dissent   -.04 (.02) ** .04 (.04) .04 (.06) 
L/R   -.00 (.01) -.00 (.02) -.06 (.04) 
Euroscepticism 1.98 (.47) *** .50 (.34)  -.65 (.28) ** .14 (.37) 1.21 (.62) ** 
Euroscepticism 
*Issue Ent. 
.58 (.18) *** -.36 (.18) **    
Formal Powers .69 (.64)  -.33 (.09) *** .33 (.21) .50 (.15)*** -.18 (.23) 
Presidency .27 (.07) *** -.20 (.16) -.05 (.09) -.04 (.15) -.38 (.28) 
Government   -.90 (.05)*** 1.4 (.09) ***  
Constant -.65 (1.34) 1.24 (.55) *** -1.68 (.40) *** -1.45 (.37) ** 2.3 (.94)  
Observations 
Individual 
933 361 1910 431 1225 
Observations 
Country 
6 6 4 4 4 
Observations Party   22 19 20 
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6. Analysis  
 
 As the results of Model 1 show, the presence of issue entrepreneurs in a party system 
does indeed lead to more activity in the form of resolutions. At the parliamentary level, the 
coefficient for the issue entrepreneurship score is significant and in the expected direction 
(.20), confirming hypothesis 2a. Substantively, the effect remains small however: A three unit 
change on the collective issue entrepreneurship score leads to about one additional resolution 
being issued per month. No evidence for an effect of internal dissent on the number of 
resolutions (hypothesis 3a) could be found. However, as expected, an increase in public 
Euroscepticism seems to lead to a larger number of resolutions issued each month, 
confirming hypothesis 1. In this context, and interesting interaction effect with the issue 
entrepreneurship score of a party system can be observed (Figure 1). As figure 1 shows, when 
the issue entrepreneurship score of a party system is high, Euroscepticism seems to have an 
increasingly positive effect on the number of resolutions, i.e. the stronger issue entrepreneurs 
are in the party system, the more resolutions will be issued when the public is Eurosceptic. 
For example, at a collective issue entrepreneurship score of 2.7, one additional resolution is 
issued for a two per cent change in public Euroscepticism. MPs might want to signal to their 
Eurosceptic voters that they take the task of scrutinising the government on EU affairs 
seriously. If a country holds the council presidency, more resolutions will be issued in a given 
month as indicated by the positive coefficient (.27). Substantively, this implies that about two 
additional resolutions are issued per month if a country holds the presidency. As expected, 
stronger formal powers do not seem to have an effect on parliamentary activity in the form of 
resolutions.   
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Figure 1: Marginal effects of Euroscepticism on the number of resolutions issued per month given the issue 
entrepreneurship score of a party system, with .05 confidence intervals 
 
In Model 2 the valence of resolutions in EU affairs was analysed at the parliamentary 
level. As expected, a higher issue entrepreneurship score seems to lead to more critical 
resolutions in EU affairs, with the coefficient being negative, confirming hypothesis 2b. A 
one unit increase in the collective issue entrepreneurship score of a parliament leads the mean 
monthly valence of all resolutions issued by this parliament to be more negative by -.13. 
Interestingly, if the parliament is collectively more right wing, more critical resolutions seem 
to be issued. Again, an interesting interaction between the issue entrepreneurship score and 
public Euroscepticism can be observed, as shown in Figure 2. For high issue entrepreneurship 
scores (i.e. with a strong presence of issue entrepreneurs in the parliament), the effect of 
Euroscepticism becomes more negative, i.e. more critical resolutions are issued as the public 
becomes more Eurosceptic. However, this effect is not statistically significant for higher issue 
entrepreneurship scores. By contrast, if parties are collectively in favour of European 
integration, an increase in Euroscepticism leads to more positive resolutions – potentially 
these parties want to bolster the government position in the light of public opposition. Issue 
entrepreneurs thus want to signal to their electorate that they are in touch with their 
Eurosceptic preferences, while this is not the case for more pro-European parties.  In general, 
issue entrepreneurs might be more topic-based parties and thus have to promote these issues. 
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In contrast to the number of resolutions, the formal powers of national parliaments seem to 
have a significant effect regarding their valence: parliaments with strong formal powers are 
seen to issue significantly more critical resolutions, i.e. a one unit increase in the formal 
powers of a parliament leads to the mean valence of all resolutions issued in one month to be 
-.33 lower. 
 
Figure 2: Marginal effect of Euroscepticism on the mean valence of resolutions issued per month given the issue 
entrepreneurship score of a party system, with .05 confidence intervals.  
 
 As for the results of the analysis at the party level, Model 3 confirms that issue 
entrepreneurs initiate more resolutions (hypothesis 2a). A two unit change on the issue 
entrepreneurship score leads to one additional resolution being issued per month. By contrast, 
if parties are internally divided on the EU, fewer resolutions are issued (-04). This is in line 
with hypothesis 3b. As explained above, the reason for this might be that an internally 
divided party might find it hard to agree on a common position for a resolution on a given 
issue. A two unit decrease in internal cohesion of a party results in one resolution less being 
issued by the party in a given month. Model 3 thus seems to confirm the findings at the 
parliamentary level at the party level. However, the effect of Euroscpticism is positive, 
contrary to hypothesis 1a. A possible explanation for this pattern could be the exclusion of 
Ireland and the United Kingdom from the subsample. It is interesting to note that government 
parties generally initiate fewer motions/resolutions than opposition parties (-.09). 
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Substantively, a government party issues about one resolution less in two months than an 
opposition party.  
 The results are less clear, however, with regard to the valence of resolutions.  As 
Model 4 shows, the coefficient for Euroscepticism is in the expected direction, but not 
significant (-.04). A one unit increase in the issue entrepreneurship score of a party thus leads 
the valence to be more negative by -.04, confirming hypothesis 2b. No significant effect for 
internal party dissent can be observed. The effect for the left/right position is in the opposite 
direction compared to the results at the party level – seemingly showing that right-wing 
parties issue more positive resolutions (.17). A similar effect can be observed for the formal 
rights of parliaments, as in the analysis at the parliamentary level, and their effect is 
significant with regard to the valence of resolution, but the sign of the coefficient is 
paradoxically in the opposite direction, i.e. negative (.5). A possible explanation for this 
could again be the exclusion of the United Kingdom from the analysis at the party level. In 
the UK, and Eurosceptic European Affairs Committee frequently criticizes its own 
government.  As expected, a strong effect for government parties can be observed: they issue 
significantly more positive resolutions than opposition parties (1.4). 
 Finally, it was analysed to which extent the ratio of the preamble to the main 
operational part of a resolution or motion differs between parties (Model 5). As explained in 
more detail above, issue entrepreneurs initiate resolutions with longer preambles and shorter 
operational parts – arguably as a sign that they bring up more general, politicized points 
which are usually placed in the preamble and care less about actual ‘technical’ scrutiny which 
takes place in the operational part. A one unit increase in the issue entrepreneurship score 
leads the ratio of preamble and operational part to be smaller by .7. This result of the 
statistical analysis could also be confirmed when hand coding and reading the 1225 
resolutions which contain both a preamble and an operational part. The fact that Eurosceptic 
parties are the drivers of parliamentary activity in the form of resolutions but simultaneously 
tend to focus on politicized points might make it questionable to what extent activity can 
actually be equated with effectiveness in this regard.  
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7. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 This paper has shown that the presence of issue entrepreneurs and generally the 
position of parties on European integration play a very important role in determining 
parliamentary activity. When Eurosceptic parties are present, more resolutions are issued. 
Moreover, these parties generally tend to issue more critical resolutions. By contrast, the 
resolutions initiated by government parties generally support the position of the government 
and can thus not be regarded as scrutiny as such. Divided parties issue fewer resolutions, 
potentially because they cannot agree on a common position on several EU-related issues to 
issue a resolution on these points. 
 Interestingly, formal powers of national parliaments do not seem to have an impact on 
the quantity of resolutions issued. However, the formal powers of national parliaments do 
seem to have an impact on the valence of resolutions – parliaments with stronger scrutiny 
powers tend to issue more critical resolutions. However, this finding is not consistent across 
the parliamentary and party levels. 
 Moreover, interaction effects between the presence of issue entrepreneurs and public 
Euroscepticism can be observed. When issue entrepreneurs are present, public 
Euroscepticism leads to more resolutions being issued by parliament as a whole. This might 
be a consequence of issue entrepreneurs wanting to signal to their voters that they take their 
role as scrutinizers seriously, whereas pro-European parties do not want to antagonize their 
voters  
In fact, the Eurosceptic parties tend to be the drivers of activity and issue a large 
number of resolutions. An observed increase in the activity of national parliaments in EU 
affairs might thus be the consequence of an increase in the strength of Eurosceptic 
tendencies. These parties – issue entrepreneurs initiate a large number of critical resolutions. 
Arguably, this could be interpreted as mirroring an increase in Eurosceptic views on behalf of 
the ultimate principal, the electorate. Following this interpretation, national parliaments 
would indeed fulfil the role as active scrutinisers by holding their governments to account in 
the line with the preferences of an increasingly Eurosceptic electorate. However, as both a 
quantitative and a qualitative analysis of the structure and content of the resolutions shows, 
resolutions and motions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are mostly concerned with general, 
politicized Eurosceptic statements. The operational part of the motions and resolutions is 
generally short and contains little detail. Therefore, it might be argued that there is little 
substantive scrutiny, i.e. parliaments might fail to make an impact on the ‘bread and butter’ 
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issues of EU politics on which they actually could have an impact. Thus formal powers might 
not necessarily lead to more activity, and activity might not lead to more effectiveness if it is 
not concerned with actual scrutiny but rather political ‘smoke and mirrors’. Thus, the hopes 
of those national parliaments in helping to overcome the democratic deficit of the European 
Union might prove to be unfounded.  
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Appendix 1: Resolutions in the six countries 
 
 
Parliament Committee Resolution Time Period 
Austrian 
Nationalrat 
 Hauptausschuss 
 Unterausschuss 
in 
Angelegenheiten 
der EU 
 Stellungnahme 
 Antrag auf 
Stellungnahme 
1996-present  
(detailed from 
2002) 
German 
Bundestag 
 Decentralized 
 Ausschuss fuer 
Angelegenheiten 
der 
Europaeischen 
Union 
 Beschlussempfehlung 
und Bericht 
 Antrag 
1990-present 
French 
Assemblee 
Nationale 
 Commission des 
affaires 
européennes 
(from July 2008) 
 Délégation de 
l’Assemblée 
nationale pour 
l’Union 
européenne 
(until July 2008) 
 Résolutions adoptees 
 Propositions de 
résolution sur des projets 
de directives et divers 
textes européens 
 Propositions de 
résolution sur des projets 
de directives et divers 
textes européens 
déposées par les députés 
 Conclusions adoptées 
par la Commission des 
affaires européennes 
1998 – present  
2002 – present 
(Propositions 
de résolution) 
Irish Dail   Sectroal 
Committees 
 Joint Committee 
on European 
Union Affairs 
(since 2011) 
 (Sub-Committee 
on the Fiscal 
Treaty) 
 Joint Committee 
on European 
Scrutiny (until 
2011) 
 Reports of the Joint 
Committee on European 
Union Affairs 
 Annual Reports 
 Number of legal acts 
meriting further scrutiny 
2007 – present  
Spanish 
Congreso de 
los 
Diputados 
 Comisión Mixta 
para la Unión 
Europea 
 Proposiciones no de Ley 2008 -present 
House of 
Commons 
 European 
Scrutiny 
Committee 
 Scrutiny Reports  
 
2005 –present  
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